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Last week, the Court’s Grand Chamber delivered the eagerly anticipated judgment in 
the case of Austin and Others v UK. The 14-3 majority ruling held that police tactics 
used during the 2001 May Day protests in London, relying on common law powers to 
prevent a breach of the peace and confining both demonstrators and passersby behind 
a police cordon for approximately seven hours, did not violate Article 5 ECHR. This 
post suggests that the Court’s reasoning betrays the internal integrity of Article 5 and 
takes insufficient account of the expressive purpose which partially defined the May 
Day events. 
 
Article 5 entails what appears to be a simple two-stage test – (1) is there an 
interference constituting a ‘deprivation of liberty’ (the threshold question)? If this 
threshold is met, and Article 5 thus engaged – (2), is the deprivation justified under 
one of the six categories in subparagraphs (a)-(f), and ‘in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law’? The two limbs of this test were answered differently in the 
lengthy judgments of the High Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords (see the 
related commentaries by David Mead, Helen Fenwick, David Feldman, and 
Genevieve Lennon).  
 
The Grand Chamber hints (as did Lord Neuberger in the House of Lords) that the 
application of this test is complicated because the ‘kettling’ of demonstrators is a 
‘non-paradigm’ interference with individual liberty – the cordoning of protesters falls 
short of arrest and confinement in a prison cell. Thus, while the Court has previously 
found violations of Article 5 in protest cases (see, for example, Steel and Others v UK 
(1998) and most recently, Schwabe and MG v Germany (2011)), these cases involved 
more typical detention scenarios. Schwabe, for example, concerned the arrest and 
detention of two demonstrators for five and a half days in anticipation of the G8 
summit protests in Rostock, June 2007. The Court made it clear that such preventive 
detention, where there is no evidence of an intention to commit specific and imminent 
unlawful acts, constitutes a violation of Article 5(1) notwithstanding the sizable 
challenges of guaranteeing security at the G8 summit. Parallels can also be drawn 
between the ‘kettling’ in Austin and the police measures used in the UK case of R (on 
the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire (2006) where anti-
war demonstrators were detained on a coach for several hours after police prevented 
them from reaching the site of their intended protest. However, the celebrated House 
of Lords judgment in Laporte does not decide the Article 5 question given their 
Lordships’ conclusion that the invocation of common law powers to prevent a non-
imminent breach of the peace could not be regarded as ‘prescribed by law’ under 
Article 11(2). The same is true of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Gillan and 
Quinton v UK (2010) concerning the police use of stop and search powers. Here, the 
Court considered it unnecessary to determine the Article 5 issue since it found a 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see further the joint dissenting opinion in 
Austin at para.13). 
 
The Austin judgment is the Strasbourg Court’s first foray into the specific practice of 
‘kettling’. In applying the initial limb of the Article 5 test, the Court has to decide 
what factors are admissible when determining whether a ‘deprivation of liberty’ has 
occurred. The Court in Austin repeated the long-established test (from Engel and 
others v the Netherlands (1976) and Guzzardi v Italy (1980)) that:  
 ‘In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” 
within the meaning of Article 5, the starting point must be his concrete 
situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the 
type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in 
question.’ (para.57)  
 
Significantly though, to this list of criteria, the Court in Austin added ‘context’. The 
Court stated:  
 
‘… the requirement to take account of the “type” and “manner of 
implementation” of the measure in question enables [the Court] to have regard 
to the specific context and circumstances surrounding types of restriction.’ 
(para.59) 
 
It is suggested here that several inter-related problems arise from making an 
assessment of ‘context’ relevant to this threshold question of Article 5. The first is 
that such reasoning clearly allows public interest considerations in by the backdoor. 
Revealingly, the Court goes on to explain that ‘the context … is an important factor 
… since situations commonly occur in modern society where the public may be called 
on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or liberty in the interests of the 
common good’ (para.59). This is seemingly at odds with the Court’s avowal in the 
preceding paragraph that ‘an underlying public interest motive … has no bearing on 
the question whether that person has been deprived of his liberty’ (para.58). More on 
these so-called ‘analogous’ and ‘commonly occurring situations’ later. 
 
One might also note here that the way in which ‘context’ is viewed will often 
determine (and so be indistinguishable from) the purported ‘purpose’ of the police 
intervention (the factor that so occupied Lord Hope in the House of Lords, see 
paras.22 and 34 of that judgment). 
 
In this light, it is worth closely examining what particular circumstances are given 
weight by the Strasbourg Court at this stage in the reasoning. Despite first suggesting 
that ‘the coercive nature of the containment … its duration, and its effect on the 
applicants, in terms of physical discomfort and inability to leave … point towards a 
deprivation of liberty’ (para.64), the Court then highlights the size of the crowd, the 
‘volatile and dangerous conditions’, and the purported lack of any alternative policing 
measure capable of averting serious injury or damage, to support the trial judge’s 
conclusion that ‘kettling’ was indeed ‘the least intrusive and most effective means to 
be applied’ (para.66). Arguably, the question of duration is negated by the Court’s 
assertion that it was ‘unable to identify a moment when the measure changed from 
what was, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty.’ 
While there are obvious limits to the degree of specificity or prescription we ought to 
expect from a judgment of the Court on questions of timing (cf. the dissenting opinion 
in Nurettin Aldemir and Others v Turkey (2007)), and this is not to suggest that 
duration of itself should be dispositive, the Court should not be so easily released 
from its responsibility to assess when a mere restriction becomes a deprivation (see 
similarly the joint dissenting opinion at para.12). 
 
Other arguments raised elsewhere in the Court’s judgment also highlight the potential 
for an expansive – and police oriented – view of ‘contextual’ factors. The Court noted 
the state’s positive obligations to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR 
(paras.56), as well as ‘the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in 
terms of priorities and resources’ (para.55 – a phrasing common in other Strasbourg 
judgments concerning police positive obligations). Could questions of police 
resources therefore be regarded as germane (as a contextual matter) to the question of 
whether a deprivation of liberty has occurred?  
 
Moreover, the Court also states that it does not wish to constrain the operational 
discretion of the police, especially because they ‘have access to information and 
intelligence not available to the general public’ (para. 56). Surely, though, to correlate 
the degree of deference due in operational decisions with the intelligence exclusively 
possessed by the police could potentially justify more intrusive forms of police 
intelligence gathering – just at the time when the role of undercover policing and 
infiltration of protest groups in the UK has deservedly come under the spotlight (see 
also R v Barkshire and others (2011)). It is important in this regard to recall an earlier 
judgment of the House of Lords – Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland 
(2006) – which held that disclosure of police reports (or at least an accurate summary 
of the information contained therein) might be necessary in order for a court to 
properly assess the proportionality of restrictions on freedom of assembly. Surely the 
same argument also applies in relation to judicial scrutiny of police contingency 
planning as relevant to the inquiry under Article 5(1). On this question, Keir Starmer 
QC – who originally acted on behalf of the claimants in the Austin case was critical of 
‘the “lack of an audit trail” showing the consideration of alternative plans being 
considered during the [police] planning and training” for May Day 2001.’ 
 
To return to the so-called ‘analogous’ or ‘commonly occurring situations’ with which 
the facts of Austin were compared, the Court argued that mere restrictions on liberty 
could not be regarded as deprivations of the same so long as they were ‘rendered 
unavoidable as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the authorities’, were 
‘necessary to avert a real risk of serious injury or damage’, and were ‘kept to the 
minimum required for that purpose’ (para.59). In making this argument, the Court had 
in mind the examples cited previously by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords – 
namely, measures taken to separate rival football crowds and measures hemming in 
motorists in the aftermath of a traffic accident. First of all, as David Mead argues in 
another blog posting on the Strasbourg judgment in Austin, these cases are not really 
analogous at all. Why so? It is suggested here that what really differentiates Austin 
from these so-called analogous cases is the fact that neither football crowds nor 
delayed motorists involve gatherings assembled primarily for an expressive purpose 
on matters of public interest. In Austin – even though some of those caught behind the 
police cordon were not themselves demonstrators (a factor that was evaluated 
differently by the majority (at para.63), and the dissenting Judges (at para.11)) – the 
context, if at all relevant to the threshold question in Article 5(1), was surely partially 
defined by the need also to ensure the practical and effective protection of the rights 
of speech and assembly. This ‘contextual’ factor could have been given greater 
weight (even though no separate complaint under Articles 10 or 11 was being 
considered in Austin). Such an approach would not only be consistent with reading 
the Convention as a whole and promoting internal consistency between its provisions 
(para.54), but would have been more compelling than the rather dubious argument 
about the implied consent of those detained (an argument with which Lord Neuberger 
flirted in the House of Lords judgment at para.61) or the assertion that such 
circumstances are ‘unavoidable’ and ‘beyond the control of the authorities’ (since this 
is a dangerously elastic concept, devoid of practical application). Such an approach, 
emphasizing the contextual importance of freedom of speech and assembly, might 
also have given greater bite to the Court’s rather limp concession that ‘[i]t cannot be 
excluded that the use of containment and crowd control techniques could, in particular 
circumstances, give rise to an unjustified deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 
5(1)’ (para.60). 
 
In a similar vein (relating to the internal consistency of the Convention), the Court did 
stress (at para.55) ‘the importance and purport of the distinct provisions of Article 5 
and of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4’, and also reflected on the fact that ‘Article 5 
should not, in principle, be interpreted in such a way as to incorporate the 
requirements of Protocol No. 4 in respect of States which have not ratified it’ (the UK 
being one of only four Council of Europe member states not yet to have ratified 
Protocol 4). The Court, however, did not return to this point even though the spectrum 
between deprivations under Article 5 and mere restrictions under Article 2 of Protocol 
4 offers a straightforward and arguably more persuasive way of evading the clutches 
of Article 5 whilst also unambiguously casting ‘kettling’ as a strategy ordinarily 
requiring justification under Article 2(3) of Protocol 4 (in countries where that 
Protocol has been ratified). 
 
The Court’s concession that ‘kettling’ might, on different facts, give rise to an 
unjustified deprivation of liberty also requires us to consider the second limb of the 
test in Article 5(1). If a ‘kettling’ case arose in which Article 5 was actually engaged, 
it would be virtually impossible for the authorities to argue that it was justified under 
any of the existing subparagraphs (a)-(f) – particularly since the Court has repeatedly 
stressed that these exceptions are exhaustive (see, for example, Austin, para.60, and 
Schwabe, para.69). It is important to remember that unlike the limiting clauses in 
Article 11 or Article 2 of Protocol 4, there is no ‘exception’ under Article 5(1) for 
security measures or public order considerations. On this basis, no other purposes 
(however well-intentioned) or extraneous factors (such as public order) can justify 
what has already been decided, under the first limb of the test, to be a deprivation of 
liberty. Arguably, the admission of ‘contextual’ factors as elaborated by the Court in 
Austin serves to introduce a de facto exception to Article 5(1). Here, it is noteworthy 
that such a provision was actually dropped during the drafting of the Convention in 
1950. A proposed draft of Article 5 read as follows:  
 
‘No person shall be deprived of his liberty … save by legal procedure in the 
case of: (a) the lawful detention of a person after a conviction or as a security 
measure involving deprivation of liberty.’  
 
Had this latter provision remained in the final text of the Convention, even ‘kettling’ 
of demonstrators which constituted a deprivation of liberty would likely have been 
capable of justification. Since it did not remain, however, the judgment in Austin 
strains the integrity of Article 5 itself. 
 
 
So where does all of this leave the practice of ‘kettling’? While sometimes spun as 
being the lesser of two (or more) evils (– the Strasbourg Court for example noted that 
‘more robust methods’ would have increased the risk of injury (para.66)), ‘kettling’ in 
practice has received widespread criticism. The UK’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights concluded that: ‘it would be a disproportionate and unlawful response to 
cordon a group of people and operate a blanket ban on individuals leaving the 
contained area, as this fails to consider whether individual circumstances require a 
different response’ (para.28 of the JCHR report). Similarly, in the wake of the 
policing of the G20 protests in 2009, the UK’s Home Affairs Committee was scathing 
of police commanders who were unwilling to allow protesters to leave a containment 
area to access medicine (paras.44-46 of the HAC report). 
 
The OSCE/ODIHR-Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly also emphasize (at para.160) that: ‘Strategies of crowd control that rely on 
containment … must only be used exceptionally: Such strategies tend to be 
indiscriminate, in that they do not distinguish between participants and non-
participants, or between peaceful and non-peaceful participants.’ This imperative of 
avoiding blanket treatment of protesters draws on the Strasbourg Court’s admissibility 
decision in Ziliberberg v Moldova (2004). Here, the Court noted that ‘an individual 
does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence 
or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the 
individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour.’  
 
There has also long been a question-mark over the impact and prudence of ‘kettling’ 
as a public order management strategy. In the aftermath of the violent G20 protests in 
Toronto in June 2010, for example, the Toronto Police Service After-Action Review 
(June 2011) concluded that: 
 
‘Crowd behaviour is often influenced by the type and manner of police 
deployment. Displays of real or implied force can lead to negative crowd 
reactions that may escalate a situation. … The use of a containment technique 
or box, referred to by some as a “kettle,” has operational merit for containing 
and preventing the spread of disorder. However, persons not involved in the 
event must have both a route of egress from and the opportunity to leave the 
affected area. Containment tactics should be modified to include specific 
direction as to when they are to be used. When used, a controlled egress point 
should be established and appropriate notification provided to the crowd.’ 
(pp.31-32) 
 
Recognition at least of the escalatory potential of blanket containment echoes the 
argument made by psychologists Steve Reicher and Clifford Stott who have warned 
that if the police treat a crowd as presenting a uniform threat of danger, this could 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy:  
 
This common treatment has led crowd members to reconceptualize themselves 
as members of a common category. Moreover, the expectation of mass support 
engendered by such a common categorization has empowered crowd members 
to resist the police. This in turn has fed back into police actions (again, we 
infer, mediated by their perceptions and their power), hence setting up a cycle 
of tension and escalating conflict. (1998: 512). 
 In contrast, the Court in Austin both perpetuated the myth of crowds as 
undifferentiated mobs and the police role as being about ‘control’ rather than 
facilitating the enjoyment of fundamental rights. 
 
Finally, there is good reason to be extremely careful about asserting a bright-line 
distinction between ‘paradigm’ and ‘non-paradigm’ Article 5 cases. The analogous 
(non-paradigm) cases discussed by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Austin 
were highlighted with a view to suggesting that certain deprivations of (or restrictions 
upon) liberty are intuitively beyond the scope of Article 5. This is a dangerous 
premise. Instead, such typologies and analogies are best avoided altogether in favour 
of a test which examines all cases by applying objective factors such as type, 
duration, effects and manner of implementation and – as crucially suggested here, in 
view of the likely deployment of ‘kettling’ strategies – whether the rights to freedom 
of speech or assembly are also engaged. The Court’s concession that ‘kettling’ might 
on different facts engage Article 5 is perhaps the only silver lining around what is 
otherwise (in the words of the dissent, para.7) ‘a bad message to police authorities’.  
